The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1990/90_622/90_622.o

Text File | 1991-05-22 | 7.6 KB | 131 lines

Subject: 90-622 -- OPINION, FLORIDA v. JIMENO




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 90-622



FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. LUZ PIEDAD JIMENO

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of florida

[May 23, 1991]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this case we decide whether a criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated when, after he
gives a police officer permission to search his automobile, the officer
opens a closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold
the object of the search.  We find that it is not.  The Fourth Amendment is
satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for
the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted
him to open a particular container within the automobile.
    This case began when a Dade County police officer, Frank Trujillo,
overheard respondent, Enio Jimeno, arranging what appeared to be a drug
transaction over a public telephone.  Believing that respondent might be
involved in illegal drug trafficking, Officer Trujillo followed his car.
The officer observed respondent make a right turn at a red light without
stopping.  He then pulled respondent over to the side of the road in order
to issue him a traffic citation.  Officer Trujillo told respondent that he
had been stopped for committing a traffic infraction.  The officer went on
to say that he had reason to believe that respondent was carrying narcotics
in his car, and asked permission to search the car.  He explained that
respondent did not have to consent to a search of the car.  Respondent
stated that he had nothing to hide, and gave Trujillo permission to search
the automobile.  After two passengers stepped out of respondent's car,
Officer Trujillo went to the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a
folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard.  The officer picked up the bag,
opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside.
    Respondent was charged with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of Florida law.  Before trial, he moved to suppress
the cocaine found in the bag on the ground that his consent to search the
car did not extend to the closed paper bag inside of the car.  The trial
court granted the motion.  It found that although respondent "could have
assumed that the officer would have searched the bag" at the time he gave
his consent, his mere consent to search the car did not carry with it
specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.  No. 88-23967
(Cir. Ct. Dade Cty., Fla., Mar. 21, 1989); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-6.
    The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision to suppress the evidence of the cocaine.  550 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989).  In doing so, the court established a per se rule that "consent
to a general search for narcotics does not extend to `sealed containers
within the general area agreed to by the defendant.' "  Ibid. (citation
omitted).  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon its decision in
State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (1989) aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. ---
(1990).  564 So. 2d 1083 (1990).  We granted certiorari to determine
whether consent to search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found
inside the vehicle.  498 U. S. --- (1990), and we now reverse the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Florida.
    The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1967).  The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes
those which are unreasonable.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. --- (1990).
Thus, we have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt
reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted
to do so.  Schneckloth v. Busta monte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (1973).  The
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness -- what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?  Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra, at --- - --- (slip op., at
5-11); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 501-502 (1983) (opinion of White,
J.); id., at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  The question before us, then,
is whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general
consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag
lying on the floor of the car.  We think that it is.
    The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.
United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).  In this case, the terms of
the search's authorization were simple.  Respondent granted Officer
Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit
limitation on the scope of the search.  Trujillo had informed respondent
that he believed respondent was carrying narcotics, and that he would be
looking for narcotics in the car.  We think that it was objectively
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search
respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car
which might bear drugs.  A reasonable person may be expected to know that
narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.  "Contraband
goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car."  Id., at 820.
The authorization to search in this case, therefore, extended beyond the
surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying on the car's floor.
    The facts of this case are therefore different from those in State v.
Wells, supra, on which the Supreme Court of Florida relied in affirming the
supression order in this case.  There the Supreme Court of Florida held
that consent to search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to
pry open a locked briefcase found inside the trunk.  It is very likely
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the
trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.
    Respondent argues, and the Florida trial court agreed with him, that if
the police wish to search closed containers within a car they must
separately request permission to search each container.  But we see no
basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's
basic test of objective reasonableness.  Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.
213 (1983).  A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the
search to which he consents.  But if his consent would reasonably be
understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment
provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.  "[T]he
community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting
search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of
crime, evidence that may ensure that a wholly innocent person is not
wrongly charged with a criminal offense."  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
supra, at 243.
    The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is accordingly reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.


------------------------------------------------------------------------------